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Between a Constitutional Rock and a 
Procedural Hard Place: Placing 
Petitioners in an Eighth Amendment 
Battle of Persuasion 
Kelley E. Nobriga* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1608, Captain George Kendall was the first person 
executed in the United States.1  Since his death, citizens of the 
United States have been executed in pursuit of retribution and 
deterrence.2  It is now, centuries after Captain Kendall’s death 
that a more modern society is starting to ask tough questions in 
the face of old school thought.  What happens when the desire for 
revenge fades after the prisoner spends decades on death row?  
What is the solution when arbitrary sentences diminish the 
purported penological purpose of death by state?  Or simply, what 
happens when the death penalty no longer fits within society’s 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2016; 
B.S., Roger Williams University, 2013.  I would like to thank the members of 
the Roger Williams University Law Review for their diligent edits during the 
drafting process, especially Casey Charkowick for encouraging me to keep 
writing and Sarah Driscoll for telling me that it is okay to stop.  I would also 
like to extend my gratitude to Professor Emily Sack for her insightful 
comments.  To my mom, sisters and grandparents, I am eternally grateful for 
your love and support.  Lastly, thank you to Nicholas Resendes for not only 
inspiring me to attend, but also for accompanying me to, the United States 
Supreme Court for the Glossip v. Gross oral arguments. 
 1.  Introduction to the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 25, 
2016). 
 2.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2767 (2015). 
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standard of decency? 
The real issue though is not what questions are being asked, 
but rather what answers are being given.  This Comment does not 
focus on the constitutionality of the death penalty per se, but 
rather on how the death penalty is implemented and the standard 
that the Supreme Court developed for evaluating a method’s 
constitutionality.  It will explore this controversial dialogue in the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court’s most recent decision involving 
capital punishment in Glossip v. Gross, which set forth the 
requirement that petitioners, in order to challenge their states’ 
execution protocol, must first present an alternative method of 
capital punishment to the court.3 
This Comment begins with a brief introduction into the 
history of the capital punishment methods.  In Part I, this 
Comment will summarize the Court’s decision in Baze v. Rees4 
and the subsequent issues—both practical and procedural—that 
have occurred as a result.  On that groundwork, Part II will 
discuss the unattainable standard set forth in Glossip.  This 
Comment will ultimately conclude that, under the Glossip 
standard, petitioners are closed off from seeking relief in court 
unless they somehow have insight into new, less painful methods 
of execution.  Absent human experimentation or scientific 
discoveries, death row petitioners are burdened with a battle of 
persuasion that they likely will never win. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXECUTION METHODS AND STANDARDS 
In 1897, a total of forty-eight states and territories used 
hanging as their primary execution method.5  New York was the 
first state to use electrocution as its method of capital punishment 
seven years earlier.6  Although electrocution was the preferred 
method of execution for almost a century, other methods, such as 
the firing squad, were also in use.7 
 
 3.  Id. at 2739. 
 4.  553 U.S. 35 (2008).  
 5.  Deborah Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 
IOWA L. REV. 319, 364 (1997). 
 6.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 42.  Eleven states joined by 1915.  See id. 
 7.  Id.; see also Brief for the Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at 
Fordham University School of Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 4, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955) 
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When Oklahoma introduced lethal injection legislation in 
1977, it quickly became the dominant method of execution in the 
United States.8  The original protocol called for a three-drug 
combination: thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium 
chloride.9  In response to the introduction of this seemingly more 
humane method, thirty-seven other states quickly adopted 
Oklahoma’s protocol without any independent testing of their 
own.10  This practice of quick decision-making became a trend 
that ultimately resulted in a 2008 challenge to Kentucky’s lethal 
injection protocol that reached the Supreme Court—a protocol 
similar to that implemented by Oklahoma forty-one years earlier.  
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court “has never 
invalidated a [s]tate’s chosen procedure for carrying out a 
sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment,”11 and each new method has been designed to be 
more humane, at least in theory.12 
Prior to 2008, however, the Court upheld previous methods of 
execution as constitutional, and ultimately developed a working 
standard for Eighth Amendment challenges.13  For example, the 
Court in Wilkerson v. Utah held that, while the firing squad was 
not cruel and unusual, certain punishments that involved 
“unnecessary cruelty” would be.14  Expanding on that standard in 
1890, the Court defined cruel punishments in In re Kemmler as 
 
[hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief] (“With the exception of a few states that 
permitted use of the firing squad, the general historical trend in the United 
States led to the transition from hanging to electrocution, which gave way 
briefly to reliance on the gas chamber, before settling on lethal injection.”).  
“In the 1880’s, the Legislature of the State of New York appointed a 
commission to find ‘the most humane and practical method known to modern 
science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capital cases.’  The 
commission recommended electrocution. . . .”  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731–32 
(quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890)).  
 8.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 42.  Oklahoma began using lethal injection in 1977 
using protocol with three drugs: First, sodium thiopental; second, a paralytic 
agent; and third, potassium chloride.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2733. 
 9.  See Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment 
Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1376 (2014). 
 10.  Id. (“Instead, because it was easier to copy another state’s procedure 
than to design a new one, state officials mimicked Oklahoma’s approach 
without actually examining its benefits and risks.”).  
 11.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 48).  
 12.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 48. 
 13.  See id.  
 14.  99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878).  
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those that “involve torture or a lingering death . . . [or] something 
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere 
extinguishment of life.”15 
II. BAZE STANDARD 
In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court once again upheld an 
execution method in the United States with regards to a lethal 
injection protocol.16  The petitioners in Baze challenged the lethal 
injection procedures in Kentucky after each were sentenced to 
death.17  At the trial court level, certain findings of fact were 
made in determining that the petitioner’s argument failed; 
specifically, the trial court found that Kentucky’s procedures were 
within the realm of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment.18 
The central issue in Baze focused on what legal standard 
should be used when evaluating the constitutionality of an 
execution method.19  Rejecting the petitioner’s challenge, the 
Court set forth additional standards to determine if a method of 
execution is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.20  The 
question put forth to the Supreme Court of the United States was 
whether Kentucky’s lethal injection procedures violated the 
Eighth Amendment; ultimately, the Court held that it did not.21 
A. Kentucky’s Protocol 
At the time, Kentucky used a three-drug combination for its 
lethal injection procedures: sodium thiopental, pancuronium 
bromide, and potassium chloride.22  If the inmate was unconscious 
from a proper administration of the first drug, it was undisputed 
that he or she would not feel any pain or discomfort associated 
with the effects of the second and third drugs, which has been 
 
 15.  136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).  
 16.  553 U.S. at 48.  
 17.  Id. at 41. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. at 50–53.  
 20.  Id. at 61. 
 21.  Id. at 47.  
 22.  Id. at 44.  The first drug induced a “deep, comalike unconsciousness” 
while pancuronium bromide, a paralytic that stops respiration, left the 
inmate unable to move; lastly, potassium chloride stopped the heart.  Id. 
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described as the “chemical equivalent of being burned at the 
stake.”23  
Kentucky’s lethal injection statute provided that “every death 
sentence shall be executed by continuous intravenous injection of 
a substance or combination of substances sufficient to cause 
death.”24  While the inmate could opt for death by electrocution, 
the statute would default to lethal injection if the inmate failed to 
make a decision within twenty days of the scheduled execution.25 
The officials at the Kentucky Department of Corrections 
developed the procedure for the execution.26  According to the 
protocol, only personnel with at least one year of professional 
experience were permitted to insert the intravenous injection (IV), 
while a certified phlebotomist and an emergency medical 
technician (EMT) administered other necessary venipunctures.27  
Other potentially less qualified personnel, however, mixed the 
chemicals and filled the syringes.28   
In addition to the medical personal, the warden and deputy 
warden would be present in the execution chambers, as they were 
responsible for conducting a visual inspection of the inmate to 
observe any signs of consciousness as well as issues with the IV 
catheters.29  A physician was present at all times “to assist in any 
effort to revive the prisoner in the event of a last-minute stay of 
execution.”30  With the exception of verifying death, however, a 
physician was prohibited from participating in the actual 
 
 23.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2781 (2015); see also Baze, 553 U.S. 
at 44.  If properly administered, sodium thiopental “eliminates any 
meaningful risk that a prisoner would experience pain from the subsequent 
injections of pancuronium and potassium chloride.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 49.  
 24.  Id. at 44–45; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West 
2006). 
 25.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 45; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(b). 
 26.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 44–45.  The procedure required 1 gram of 
sodium thiopental, 50 milligrams of pancuronium bromide, and 240 
milliequivalents of potassium chloride.  See id. at 45.  Between each injection, 
25 milligrams of saline were injected to prevent any clogging from the 
previous substance.  Id. 
 27.  See id.  
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. at 45–46. 
 30.  Id. at 46.  It should also be noted that, at the time of this case, 
Kentucky had only used the above lethal injection procedure on one prior 
inmate, Eddie Lee Harper.  Id.  There were no issues reported in regards to 
his execution procedure.  Id. 
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execution by the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical 
Ethics.31 
B. Petitioner’s Arguments in Baze 
The petitioners argued that Kentucky’s lethal injection 
procedures were unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment 
due to the potential for maladministration of the lethal drugs and 
the state’s failure to adhere to safer alternatives, as set forth by 
petitioner.32  Moreover, the petitioners argued that Kentucky’s 
lethal injection procedure created an unnecessary risk of pain.33  
Recognizing that some level of pain is inherent in the lethal 
injection process, petitioners argued that the Eighth Amendment 
does not allow for the “unnecessary risk” of pain, and the Court 
must evaluate “(a) the severity of pain risked, (b) the likelihood of 
that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to which alternative means 
are feasible, either by modifying existing execution procedures or 
adopting alternative procedures.”34 
The petitioners conceded, however, that, under normal 
procedures, the process would be humane and constitutional 
because the first drug would render the inmate insensitive to 
pain.35  However, if the personnel improperly administered the 
 
 31.  See Lee Black & Robert M. Sade, Lethal Injection and Physicians: 
State Law vs Medical Ethics, 298 JAMA 2779, 2780, 2781 (2007). 
 32.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 41. 
 33.  Id. at 49.  However, Kentucky urged the Court to use the same 
“substantial risk” test that the circuit court used, which focused on the 
likelihood of needless suffering.  See id. at 48.  For a claimant to succeed on 
the claim, there “must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively 
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from pleading that they 
were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.’”  Id. at 
50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 (1994)).  In this 
analysis, a distinction is drawn between “a series of abortive attempts at 
[execution],” “[a]ccidents . . . for which no man is to blame,” and “isolated 
mishap[s].”  Id. (quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 
462, 471 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, multiple 
incidents could constitute an intolerable risk of harm under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See id.; Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 
471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 34.  Baze, 553 U.S at 47. 
 35.  Id. at 49.  The trial court, using the “substantial risk” test, found 
that Kentucky’s procedures were within the realm of the Eighth 
Amendment’s requirement against cruel and unusual punishment.  See id. at 
41.  After the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed, petitioners filed a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States questioning whether 
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second drug, a paralytic, it would leave the inmate unable to 
motion for help during what would be a painful administration of 
the second and third drugs.36  The petitioners further argued that 
the risk of such improper administration was high due to the 
inadequacy of the protocol and inexperience of the staff.37  As an 
alternative, the Baze petitioners suggested that the state use a 
one-drug protocol that “dispenses with the use of pancuronium 
[bromide] and potassium chloride.”38  The petitioners also argued 
that Kentucky should be required to employ additional, trained 
personnel to assist in the monitoring of consciousness.39 
C. Respondent’s Arguments in Baze 
In response, Kentucky urged the Court to use the “substantial 
risk” test that was used at the time in the lower courts.40  Under 
the test, the risk of pain must be “‘sure or very likely to cause 
serious illness and needless suffering’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently 
imminent dangers’” for the protocol to be considered substantially 
risky.41  For a claimant to succeed under this high standard, there 
“must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively 
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from 
pleading that they were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes of the 
Eighth Amendment.’”42 
 
Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure violated the Eighth Amendment.  See 
id.  The Court held that it did not.  Id. at 49–51. 
 36.   See id. at 44.  “First, Kentucky’s use of pancuronium bromide to 
paralyze the inmate means he will not be able to scream after the second 
drug is injected, no matter how much pain he is experiencing.”  Id. at 122 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 37.  Id. at 54 (plurality opinion).  
 38.  Id. at 51. 
 39.  Id.  The petitioners suggested that the personnel employ safeguards 
to monitor consciousness, such as a sphygmomanometer or an 
echocardiogram.  Id. at 58–59. 
 40.  Id. at 48; see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006).  
 41.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 
34–35 (1993)).  
 42.  Id. at 50 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846 & n.9 
(1994)).  
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D. Baze Standard Defined 
1. Plurality Opinion 
Initially, the Court noted that, while the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, it “does not demand the 
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions.”43  The 
Court also distinguished between “a series of abortive attempts,”44 
“[a]ccidents . . . for which no man is to blame,”45 and “isolated 
mishap[s].”46  Multiple isolated incidents, however, could 
constitute an “objectively intolerable risk of harm” under the 
Eighth Amendment.47 
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument and instead decided 
to adopt the substantial risk standard announced in Farmer v. 
Brennan.48  Under this test, an “alternative procedure must be 
feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a 
substantial risk of severe pain.”49  Notably, “a condemned prisoner 
cannot successfully challenge a State’s method of execution merely 
by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative.”50  If a 
petitioner were, however, able to meet this burden, and a state 
refused to change its protocol in response, the protocol would 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.51 
Applying the substantial risk analysis, the Court rejected the 
 
 43.  Id. at 47. 
 44.  Id.; see also Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (analyzing a hypothetical situation where 
multiple “abortive attempts” could present different issues from the accident 
at issue in Resweber).  
 45.  See Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463 (holding that accidental situations in 
execution procedures where malevolence is lacking does not constitute an 
Eighth Amendment violation). 
 46.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Resweber, 329 U.S. at 462, 471) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 47.  Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.” 
 48.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.  
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. at 51.  The Court found that permitting such an argument would 
frustrate the legal system by requiring it to find “best practices” for 
executions.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 41. 
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contention that Kentucky’s procedure was “objectively intolerable” 
because thirty states (out of the thirty-six states then using lethal 
injection), as well as the federal government, used the same three-
drug sequence as Kentucky.52  Rather, the Court noted, “[n]o 
State uses or has ever used the alternative one-drug protocol 
belatedly urged by the petitioners.”53 
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to 
the protocol, including their request for additional personnel, on 
the basis of viable alternatives because “the Eighth Amendment 
[does not] require[] Kentucky to adopt the untested alternative 
procedures petitioners have identified.”54  The Court ultimately 
affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that Kentucky’s 
lethal injection procedure was constitutional.55 
2. Concurrence by Justice Thomas 
The concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, which Justice 
Scalia joined, agreed that the petitioners failed to show that 
Kentucky’s protocol violated the Eighth Amendment.56  However, 
Justice Thomas disagreed with the plurality’s standard, and 
instead argued that the inquiry should focus on whether the 
method of execution is “deliberately designed to inflict pain.”57  He 
noted that the Court has never held that an execution method 
violated the Constitution simply because it involved pain, 
“whether ‘substantial,’ ‘unnecessary,’ or ‘untoward,’” that could be 
eliminated by adopting an alternative procedure.58  Rather, 
methods of execution, such as burning at the stake and beheading, 
are in violation of the Constitution if they are “designed to inflict 
torture as a way of enhancing a death sentence . . . .”59 
 
 52.  Id. at 53.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 54.  The dissent argued that requiring “rough-and-ready tests,” 
such as “calling the inmate’s name, brushing his [or her] eyelashes, or 
presenting him [or her] with strong, noxious odors—could materially decrease 
the risk of administering the second and third drugs before the sodium 
thiopental has taken effect.”  The Court rejected this, finding that the risk of 
consciousness is only apparent if the first drug is not administered properly.  
See id. at 60. 
 55.  Id. at 41. 
 56.  Id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 101. 
 59.  Id. at 102. 
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Justice Thomas further stated that the Court has never 
required additional safeguards for a procedure merely because 
there was a possibility of a defect.60  In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, for example, the Court held that Louisiana would not 
violate the Constitution if it subjected an inmate to a second 
electrocution after the first attempt was unsuccessful.61  In that 
case, as Justice Thomas claimed, the state was not required to 
“implement additional safeguards or alternative procedures in 
order to reduce the risk of a second malfunction” unless the Court 
found evidence of an intention to inflict unnecessary pain.62  
Lastly, because the plurality did not give more guidance as to 
what is considered “substantial,” or what reduced level of risk is 
“significant,” Justice Thomas predicted that the lower courts 
would struggle with the new, “unprecedented and unworkable 
standard . . . .”63 
3. Dissenting Opinion 
Disagreeing with the plurality opinion, Justice Ginsberg 
argued that the true question was not only the adequacy of the 
first drug, but also whether Kentucky’s procedures contained 
sufficient safeguards to ensure that the sodium thiopental 
rendered the inmate unconscious before the administration of the 
last two drugs.64  Justice Ginsberg would have remanded the 
matter to the lower courts to determine “whether the failure to 
include readily available safeguards to confirm that the inmate is 
unconscious after injection of sodium thiopental, in combination 
with the other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, creates an 
untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and 
unnecessary pain.”65 
Initially, Justice Ginsburg discussed the ability of Kentucky’s 
protocol to safeguard against harms caused by improper 
 
 60.  Id. at 107.  
 61.  See id. at 100 (citing 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947)).  
 62.  See id. at 103. 
 63.  Id. at 106. 
 64.  Id. at 114 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 65.  Id. at 123.  Justice Ginsburg cited to other state protocols, noting 
that many other procedures required closer attention to an inmate’s 
consciousness than Kentucky’s protocol then provided.  See id. at 119–21.  
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administration.66  Even the petitioners conceded in their brief to 
the Kentucky Supreme Court that “[t]he easiest and most obvious 
way to ensure that an inmate is unconscious during an 
execution . . . is to check for consciousness prior to injecting 
pancuronium [bromide].”67  However, much like Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg also argued that the plurality’s 
standard would lead to uncertainty in the lower courts.68 
III. POST-BAZE ISSUES 
A stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such 
as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner 
establishes that the State’s lethal injection protocol 
creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain.  He must 
show that the risk is substantial when compared to the 
known and available alternatives.  A State with a lethal 
injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we 
uphold today would not create a risk that meets this 
standard.69 
The Baze standard came into existence at a time where 
known and available alternatives to lethal injection drugs 
existed—a time where states had options in regards to doses and 
chemicals.  Shortly after the standard was announced, however, 
the lethal injection landscape changed, calling the Baze standard 
into question.  Specifically, two aspects of the Baze standard were 
challenged.  First, clarification on the term “substantially similar” 
when comparing alternative drugs, and second, what could a 
petitioner do if he or she cannot provide the court with a known 
alternative due to a drug shortage or unavailable scientific 
testing? 
 
 66.  Id. at 114.  Justice Ginsburg cited to the Supreme Court decisions in 
Wilkinson and In re Kemmler, noting that the Court “must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”  Id at 115–16 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 
(2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 67.  Id. at 123 (second alteration in original) (quoting Brief for Appellants 
at 41, Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006) (No. 2005-SC-00543)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 68.  See id. at 117. 
 69.  Id. at 61 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).  
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A. Questionable Decision-Makers and Protocols 
One major issue with Baze was the uncertainty about what 
language constituted its holding and standard.  In Baze, there 
were five concurring opinions from Justices Alito, Stevens, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Breyer.70  Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting 
opinion, which was joined by Justice Souter.71  Chief Justice 
Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, which Justices 
Kennedy and Alito joined.72  As one court described the confusion: 
“[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 
by those [m]embers who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds . . . .”73  As mentioned above, Justices Thomas 
and Scalia disagreed with the holding that a substantial risk of 
pain standard should be used and instead argued for an inquiry 
into whether a method involved a deliberate and unnecessary risk 
of pain.74  Therefore, it is unclear whether the majority of the 
Court actually required that a petitioner prove that a particular 
method has a substantial risk of pain when compared to a known 
and available alternative. 
Notably, soon after the Baze decision, sodium thiopental, the 
first drug in Kentucky’s protocol, was removed from the market by 
European manufacturers in an effort to protest capital 
punishment in the United States.75  Without sodium thiopental, 
many states were forced to find an alternative drug to induce 
 
 70.  See Baze, 553 U.S. at 63, 71, 87, 94, 107 (concurring opinions).  
 71.  See id. at 113 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 72.  See id. at 35. 
 73.  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 74.  See id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 75.  See Juergen Baetz, America’s Lethal Injection Drug Crisis Starts in 
Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.business 
insider.com/americas-lethal-injection-drug-crisis-starts-in-europe-2014-2.  
“The shortage of sodium thiopental led prison officials to seek out 
questionable alternative sources of the drug throughout the world, ranging 
from England to Pakistan.”  Deborah Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-
Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1361 (2014); see also Despite Drug Shortage, 2 
States Carry on with Executions Using Single Dose of Potent Sedative, FOX 
NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/08/04/despite-drug-
shortage-2-states-carry-on-with-executions-using-single-dose/; Erik Eckholm 
& Katie Zezima, States Face Shortage of Key Lethal Injection Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/us/22lethal.html.  
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unconsciousness.76 
1. Quick Decisions 
Because lethal injection drugs became scarce on the market, 
some states were forced to find alternative drugs to carry out their 
procedures.77  States sought out constitutionally adequate 
alternative procedures that would not be considered cruel and 
unusual punishment in light of the unavailability of known 
methods.78 
But how could states ensure that these new, alternative lethal 
injection methods would actually serve the penological purpose 
the states intended? The Director of the Death Penalty 
Information Center responded that experimentation with 
execution procedures could lead to “unexpected consequences,” 
and found that some states have been “winging it.”79  Similarly, in 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Chris McGreal, Lethal Injection Drug Production Ends in 
the U.S., GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2011, 1:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2011/jan/23/lethal-injection-sodium-thiopental-hospira.  Again, the 
Court in Baze held that a request for a stay of execution should be rejected 
unless the prisoner can demonstrate a risk of substantial pain and prove that 
there are known drug alternatives available.  Baze, 553 U.S. at 52.  
Additionally, the challenge should be rejected if the drug(s) being challenged 
is “substantially similar” to the protocol upheld in Baze; the true challenge 
has become deciding what chemicals are substantially similar or what 
combination is available in the face of a drug shortage.  See id. at 61. 
 77.  See, e.g., Missouri Execution Halted Over Fears of Drug Shortage, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/ 
oct/11/missouri-execution-halted-execution-drug-shortage (“Drug makers in 
recent years have stopped selling potentially lethal pharmaceuticals to 
prisons and corrections departments because they don’t want them used in 
executions.  That has left the nearly three dozen death penalty states, 
including Missouri, scrambling for alternatives.”).  Without an effective first 
drug, the effects of the second and third drugs could rise to the level of 
torture.  See Denno, supra note 75, at 1361; Jeanne Whalen & Nathan 
Koppel, Lundbeck Seeks to Curb Use of Drug in Executions, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230458400457641909267
5627536 (last updated July 1, 2011, 2:22 PM). 
 78.  Mark Berman, The Recent History of States Contemplating Firing 
Squads and Other Execution Methods, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/05/22/the-recent-
history-of-states-contemplating-firing-squads-and-other-execution-methods/ 
(explaining that Virginia has been considering the electric chair, Missouri 
has been considering the gas chamber, and Utah may reinstitute the firing 
squad).  
 79.  Tracy Connor, Firing Squad and Gas Chamber Closer to Reality in 
Three States, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
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her Glossip dissent seven years after Baze was decided, Justice 
Sotomayor wrote about the painful consequences of an ineffective 
first drug in a lethal injection protocol: 
The latter two drugs are intended to paralyze the inmate 
and stop his heart.  But they do so in a torturous manner, 
causing burning, searing pain.  It is thus critical that the 
first drug, midazolam, do what it is supposed to do, which 
is to render and keep the inmate unconscious.80 
Because the Baze plurality upheld Kentucky’s protocol, which 
was created by correctional officers, it essentially set the 
precedent that such officers—without prior education or 
knowledge in the area of medicine or chemicals—were qualified to 
choose the methods that the state would use to execute those on 
death row.  It follows then that “[n]o matter what lethal injection 
statute a legislature has in place or how a court interprets that 
statute, both legislatures and courts delegate the actual business 
of executions to a department of corrections.”81 
Each time a state implements a new lethal injection protocol, 
it calls into question the method for choosing the particular drugs 
that are devoid of a known testing procedure to ensure that the 
protocol will induce its intended effect.  This, in turn, raises the 
following: How can a state ensure that its protocol will be 
successful on prisoners without first engaging in human 
experimentation?  The prison officials who craft these execution 
protocols and select the drugs do not have the requisite medical or 
scientific backgrounds that would qualify them to make these 
complicated determinations.82 
As history demonstrates, states adopted lethal injection 
generally and the three-drug protocol specifically without serious 
study or independent analysis.  States uniformly followed 
Oklahoma in delegating prison officials the details of lethal 
injections.  Contemporary evidence indicates that prison officials 
likely lack the necessary expertise to develop lethal injection 
 
storyline/lethal-injection/firing-squad-gas-chamber-closer-reality-three-states 
-n305266. 
 80.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2780–81 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting).  
 81.  Denno, supra note 75, at 1356. 
 82.  See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 26.  
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protocols and fail to rely upon scientific or medical study.  Yet, 
these prison officials, operating outside of the public eye, are 
tasked with developing procedures by which inmates will be 
executed.83 
In the face of an uncertain “substantially similar” standard 
and quick medical decisions made by those lacking medical 
experience, states have struggled to find suitable alternatives for 
their protocols.  Conversely, petitioners have lacked an alternative 
method to challenge these protocols, as they could not find known 
or available drugs necessary to establish a claim—a requirement 
that might not even had been required by the Baze plurality. 
2. Midazolam 
The first alternative to sodium thiopental, pentobarbital, was 
adopted by fourteen states and appeared to be effective.84  
Pentobarbital, a strong barbiturate like sodium thiopental, is used 
to euthanize animals of all sizes, ranging from rabbits to beached 
whales.85  The Danish manufacturer, Lundbeck Inc., discontinued 
supplying pentobarbital to facilities using its product for capital 
punishment, expressing strong anti-death penalty sentiments.86  
 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http:// 
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).  
But see Denno, supra note 75, at 1364 (“Like sodium thiopental, 
pentobarbital’s effects are most difficult to measure when a state uses a 
three-drug protocol because the subsequent paralytic agent (pancuronium 
bromide) can mask the first drug’s effects.”).  Oklahoma was the first state to 
use pentobarbital in 2010.  See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 22; see 
also Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
substituting pentobarbital for sodium thiopental did not constitute a 
substantial risk of pain); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 
2010) (holding that pentobarbital was sufficient for inducing consciousness); 
State by State Lethal Injection, supra. 
 85.  Denise Grady, Three-Drug Protocol Persists for Lethal Injections, 
Despite Ease of Using One, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A16. 
 86.  See Whalen & Koppel, supra note 77.  In a letter to Ohio Department 
of Rehabilitation and Corrections, the President of Lundbeck, Inc. wrote of its 
awareness that Ohio was using the drug for capital punishment purposes, 
and stated it was “adamantly opposed” to such use.  Letter from Staffan 
Schuberg, President Lundbeck Inc., to Gary Mohr, Director Dept. of 
Rehabilitation and Correction (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/documents/LundbeckLeth Inj.pdf.  Oklahoma also used pentobarbital for 
its executions, but was unable to obtain the drug in March 2014.  See Glossip 
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
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However, midazolam eventually took pentobarbital’s place in the 
lethal injection “cocktail.”87 
Unlike sodium thiopental and pentobarbital, both powerful 
barbiturates, midazolam is a benzodiazepine, which is used to 
induce sleepiness, relieve anxiety, and, most commonly, treat 
epilepsy.88  The Federal Drug Administration (FDA), however, has 
not approved the use of midazolam as a sole anesthetic in medical 
procedures.89  When used for lethal injection, midazolam is often 
coupled with either one or two other drugs to form a potentially 
deadly cocktail.90  States such as Oklahoma and Florida use 
midazolam in a three-drug sequence with pancuronium bromide, a 
paralytic, and potassium chloride.91  Alternatively, Ohio and 
Arizona are known to use a two-drug procedure combining 
midazolam with hydromorphone, a strong painkiller.92 
Without adequate testing on humans, however, midazolam’s 
effectiveness is ultimately unknown, and its use has led to 
speculation about lethal injection and the death penalty as a 
whole.  For example, on January 16, 2014, Dennis McGuire was 
executed in Ohio with both midazolam and hydromorphone.93  
McGuire allegedly arched his back and clenched his fists during 
the twenty-six minute execution, which raised concern about the 
 
 87.  See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 23–24. Oklahoma 
substituted midazolam for pentobarbital in 2014.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 
2733–34 (majority opinion). 
 88.  Drugs and Supplements Midazolam (Injection Route), MAYO CLINIC,  
http://www.mayoclinic.org/drugs-supplements/midazolam-injection-route/ 
description/drg-20064813 (last visited Feb. 19, 2016); see also Lesley K. 
Humphries & Lea S. Eiland, Treatment of Acute Seizures: Is Intranasal 
Midazolam a Viable Option?, J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS, 
Apr.–Jun. 2013, at 79, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3668 
946/pdf/i1551-6776-18-2-79.pdf; Ed Cara, What is Midazolam: Why Are 
Doctors Worried the Lethal Injection Drug Won’t Sedate Death Row Inmates?, 
MED. DAILY (Jun. 29, 2015, 7:35 PM), http://www.medicaldaily.com/what-
midazolam-why-are-doctors-worried-lethal-injection-drug-wont-sedate-death-
row-340468.  
 89.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2783 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 90.  Lethal Injection, CAP. PUNISHMENT U.K., http://www.capitalpunish 
mentuk.org/injection.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2016). 
 91.  State by State Lethal Injection, supra note 84. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Tracy Connor, Ohio Says Controversial Execution of Dennis McGuire 
Was ‘Humane’, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.nbc 
news.com/storyline/lethal-injection/ohio-says-controversial-execution-dennis-
mcguire-was-humane-n91811. 
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new drug combination.94  Later that same month, in Arizona, 
Joseph Rudolph Wood was injected with the very same chemicals 
in an execution that lasted one hour and fifty-seven minutes, 
during which witnesses claimed to have seen Wood continually 
gasping for air.95  Again, in April 2014, Clayton Lockett was 
executed in Oklahoma during a procedure that lasted forty-three 
minutes.96  After being declared unconscious, Lockett stated, 
“something is wrong,” and “[t]he drugs aren’t working.”97   
After an investigation, Oklahoma claimed that the failed 
procedure was the result of an infiltrated IV, “which means that 
‘the IV fluid, rather than entering Lockett’s blood stream, had 
leaked into the tissue surrounding the IV access point.’”98  
However, upon the release of Lockett’s autopsy results, it was 
shown that the “concentration of midazolam in Lockett’s blood was 
more than sufficient to render an average person unconscious.”99  
Oklahoma’s response to the tense criticism was to increase the 
dose of midazolam from 100 to 500 milligrams for future execution 
procedures.100 
Moreover, even the very experts who use midazolam on a 
daily basis disagree with its use in lethal injection protocols.101  
For example, Doctor Kent Diveley, an anesthesiologist in 
California, was asked to review Dennis McGuire’s execution.102  
He found that personnel administered only ten milligrams of 
 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Tom Dart, Arizona Inmate Joseph Wood Was Injected 15 Times with 
Execution Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:40 AM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/arizona-inmate-injected-15-times-execution-
drugs-joseph-wood. 
 96.  Katie Fretland, Scene at Botched Oklahoma Execution of Clayton 
Lockett Was ‘a Bloody Mess’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2014, 11:04 AM), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/13/botched-oklahoma-execution-
clayton-lockett-bloody-mess. 
 97.  See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2782 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 98.  Id. at 2734 (majority opinion) (quoting Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 
721, 725 (10th Cir. 2015)).  
 99.  Id. at 2782. 
 100.  Id. at 2734.   
 101.  Alan Johnson, Dennis McGuire’s Execution Was Not ‘Humane,’ 
Doctor Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2014, 7:19 AM), http://www. 
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/08/12/inmate-suffered-pain-during-
execution-doctor-says.html. 
 102.  Id. 
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midazolam and forty milligrams of hydromorphone.103  Dr. 
Diveley commented that an anesthesiologist “would not depend on 
a 10 mg dose of midazolam to provide for total loss of memory, or 
to produce an unconscious state.”104  Dr. Diveley further noted 
that during the execution, McGuire was “straining against his 
restraints, struggling to breathe, and making hand gestures” and 
that such actions signified consciousness.105  Dr. Diveley 
ultimately concluded that McGuire’s death “was not a humane 
execution,” and urged Ohio to consider other drug 
combinations.106 
IV. GLOSSIP V. GROSS 
A. Lower Court Decision 
Charles Warner, Richard Glossip, John Grant, and Benjamin 
Cole were all sentenced to death by jury in Oklahoma for heinous 
crimes.107  John Grant, while imprisoned, stabbed to death a food 
service worker at his prison.108  Richard Glossip, the manager of a 
motel, hired one of his employees to kill the motel’s owner with a 
baseball bat.109  Charles Warner raped and murdered the 
daughter of his girlfriend, an eleven-month-old child.110  Lastly, 
Benjamin Cole snapped the spine of his nine-month-old daughter 
in half.111 
 
 103.  KENT DIVELEY, DIVELEY MED. CORP., MEDICAL REPORT ¶ 6 (Aug. 4, 
2014), http://www.otse.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2014-08-12-Dr.-Report 
.pdf. 
 104.  Id. ¶ 7.   
 105.  Id. ¶ 9. 
 106.  Id. ¶¶ 9–11. 
 107.  See Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 723–24 (10th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 108.  See Grant v. State, 58 P.3d 783, 789 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002), 
judgment vacated, Grant v. Oklahoma, 540 U.S. 801 (2003), and overruled by 
Jones v. State, 134 P.3d 150 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see also Warner, 776 
F.3d at 724. 
 109.  See Glossip v. State, 157 P.3d 143, 147–48 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007), 
stay of execution denied by Glossip v. Oklahoma, 136 S. Ct. 26 (2015) (mem.); 
see also Warner, 776 F.3d at 724. 
 110.  See Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 856 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006), stay 
of execution denied by Warner v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 824 (2015) (mem.); see also 
Warner, 776 F.3d at 724. 
 111.  See Cole v. State, 164 P.3d 1089, 1092 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007), stay 
of execution granted by Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 1197 (2015) (mem.); see 
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At the time of their impending execution, Oklahoma was 
using the same drug combination as was used in Clayton Lockett’s 
execution, except with a higher dosage of midazolam.112  
According to the protocol, the Director of Oklahoma’s Department 
of Corrections had the sole discretion to choose from four 
alternative drug doses and combinations that could be used in a 
lethal injection procedure.113  For the four inmates, the Director 
chose the fourth method, consisting of 500 milligrams of 
midazolam, 100 milligrams of vecoronium bromide, and 240 
milliequivalents of potassium chloride.114 
In light of Lockett’s execution, the death row inmates 
challenged Oklahoma’s use of midazolam, arguing that the drug 
would not render them unconscious but rather leave them 
vulnerable to the burning effects that the second and third drugs 
would produce.115  They also argued that the procedure and drugs 
used in Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocols were not 
scientifically sound and their use would be an attempt at 
nonconsensual human experimentation.116  The inmates 
requested a preliminary injunction from the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.117  The district court 
held a three-day evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the 
motion, concluding that the petitioners had not established the 
requisite likelihood of success on the merits required to obtain a 
preliminary injunction.118 
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the inmates argued that the 
district court erred in determining that Oklahoma’s three-drug 
cocktail was substantially similar to the drugs upheld in Baze, and 
as such, the court below had applied an incorrect standard—one 
which required proof of an alternative execution method.119  The 
 
also Warner, 776 F.3d at 724. 
 112.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2782 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 113.  Warner, 776 F.3d at 726.  
 114.  Id.  Midazolam is supposed to induce unconsciousness while the 
second drug paralyzes the inmate, who will go into cardiac arrest with the 
administration of the third drug.  See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732, 2734 
(majority opinion).  
 115.  See Warner, 776 F.3d at 726–27; see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2780–
81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 116.  See Warner, 776 F.3d at 727. 
 117.  See id. at 723–24.  
 118.  Id. at 727.  
 119.  See id. at 731.  The plaintiffs also argued that the district court 
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Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
motion, concluding that it was bound by its decision in Pavatt v. 
Jones—a decision that relied on the alleged plurality standard 
announced in Baze.120  In Pavatt, the Tenth Circuit found that 
expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of pentobarbital 
coupled with the sufficiency of Oklahoma’s procedures did not 
present an unconstitutional threat of harm under Baze, which 
required proof of a substantial risk of pain.121  Accordingly, the 
district court in Warner v. Gross relied on expert testimony122 to 
verify that 500 milligrams of midazolam would render a person 
unconscious and insensate to pain.123 
B. Petition to the United States Supreme Court 
The four death row prisoners then filed a petition for writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, alleging that 
midazolam is incapable of rendering a person insensate to pain.124  
Without achieving a deep level of unconsciousness, the inmates 
repeated their argument that they would be subject to cruel and 
unusual punishment by the administration of the second and 
 
failed to consider the “evolving standards of decency.”  See id. 
 120.  See id. at 732; see also Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th 
Cir. 2010).  
 121.  See Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1339.  Specifically, the Tenth Circuit agreed 
with the district court that “[a] stay of execution may not be granted on [such] 
grounds . . . unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s lethal 
injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain . . . [and] that 
the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available 
alternatives.”  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 
61 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 122.  At the three-day evidentiary hearing, the expert for the state, Dr. 
Roswell Evans, claimed that “a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would 
render the person unconscious and insensate during the remainder of the 
[execution] procedure.”  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2784 (2015) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Conversely, the expert for the plaintiffs, Dr. David Lubarsky, relied 
on evidence showing that “[m]idazolam cannot be used alone . . . to maintain 
adequate anesthesia.”  Id. (quoting JG Reves et al., Midazolam: 
Pharmacology and Uses, 62 ANESTHESIOLOGY 310, 318 (1985)). 
 123.  The district court relied on three specific elements of Oklahoma’s 
protocol, specifically: (1) the requirement of having two IV sites, (2) the 
monitoring of inmates’ consciousness throughout the procedure, and (3) the 
confirmation of IV viability.  See Warner, 776 F.3d at 729–30.  
 124.  See Brief for Petitioners at 2–3, Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (No. 14-
7955); see also Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2731 (majority opinion).  
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third drugs, which, due to a severe burning effect, would result in 
their painful deaths.125  The Supreme Court initially denied a stay 
of execution on January 15, 2015, and, later that same evening, 
petitioner Charles Warner was executed with a drug sequence 
that included midazolam.126  Warner’s last words were “my body 
is on fire.”127 
On January 23, 2015, just over a week after Warner’s 
execution, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for the remaining 
three petitioners to address the following issues:128 
(1) Is it constitutionally permissible for a state to carry 
out an execution using a three-drug protocol where: 
(a) there is a well-established scientific consensus 
that the first drug has no pain relieving properties 
and cannot reliably produce deep, coma-like 
unconsciousness, and 
(b) it is undisputed that there is a substantial, 
constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain and 
suffering from the administration of the second and 
third drugs when a prisoner is conscious? 
(2) Does the Baze-plurality stay standard apply when 
states are not using a protocol substantially similar to the 
one that this Court considered in Baze? 
(3) Must a prisoner establish the availability of an 
alternative drug formula even if the state’s lethal 
injection protocol, as properly administered, will violate 
the Eighth Amendment?129 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioners’ 
arguments and found that they failed to meet their burden under 
the standard set forth in Baze.130  Justice Alito authored the 
majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy.  Justice Breyer, joined by 
 
 125.  See id. at 2.   
 126.  See id. at 21–22, 25.  
 127.  See id. at 22.  
 128.  Id. at 25.  Respondent’s application for stays were subsequently 
granted on January 28, 2015.  Id.  
 129.  Id. at i. 
 130.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2730–31 (2015). 
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Justice Ginsberg, wrote a dissenting opinion.131  Justice 
Sotomayor also wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justices Breyer, 
Ginsberg, and Kagan joined.132 
C. The Majority’s Unattainable Standard and Justice 
Sotomayor’s Response 
In finding for the respondent, Justice Alito began the majority 
opinion with the assumption that, “because it is settled that 
capital punishment is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily follows that 
there must be a [constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”133  On 
that premise, the Court affirmed petitioner’s death sentences, 
mainly for the following two reasons: (1) petitioners failed to prove 
that midazolam presented a substantial risk of pain as required 
by Baze, and (2) petitioners did not establish that the district 
court committed clear error in finding that midazolam will not 
cause severe pain.134 
1. The Battle of Persuasion 
The Glossip Court affirmed the district court’s decision 
because it found that (1) petitioners failed to prove that 
“midazolam is sure or very likely to result in needless suffering,” 
and that there was a “substantial risk of severe pain,” and (2) 
numerous courts had found midazolam sufficient to render a 
person insensate.135 
In analyzing the expert testimony from both sides, the Court 
commented on how Dr. Lubarsky, petitioner’s expert witness, was 
unable to rebut the respondent’s expert witness statement that 
500 milligrams of midazolam would render a person sufficiently 
unconscious in the presence of the second and third drugs.136  The 
Court concluded that “petitioners’ own experts effectively 
conceded that they lacked evidence to prove their case beyond 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 2732–33 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 
U.S. 35, 47 (2008)).  
 134.  Id. at 2731.  
 135.  Id. at 2739–40. 
 136.  Id. at 2741.  Dr. Lubarsky stated, “there is no scientific literature 
addressing the use of midazolam as a manner to administer lethal injections 
in humans.”  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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dispute.”137  Ultimately, “the fact that a low dose of midazolam is 
not the best drug for maintaining unconsciousness during surgery 
says little about whether a 500-milligram dose of midazolam is 
constitutionally adequate for purposes of conducting an 
execution.”138 
In response to the majority’s finding that midazolam is 
constitutionally adequate, Justice Sotomayor focused her dissent 
on the drug’s purported ceiling effect.139  Having noted the 
disputed testimony of experts on both sides, the dissent argued 
that the district court erred in finding that 500 milligrams of 
midazolam would render a person insensate to pain.140  
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that the respondent’s expert, 
Dr. Evans, did not rely on scientific literature, but instead used 
less reliable sources, such as www.drugs.com.141  The dissent also 
believed that petitioners’ experts rebutted any purported evidence 
from Dr. Evans by offering evidence that midazolam’s ceiling 
effect is not limited to the person’s spinal cord, but also affects the 
brain, which prevents a deeper level of unconsciousness from 
occurring irrespective of the increased dosage.142  Justice 
Sotomayor recognized that such scientific testimony might 
sometimes be outside of a court’s area of expertise, but 
“[e]specially when important constitutional rights are at stake, 
federal district courts must carefully evaluate the premises and 
evidence on which scientific conclusions are based, and appellate 
courts must ensure that the courts below have in fact carefully 
considered all the evidence presented.”143 
The majority, however, found Oklahoma’s procedures and 
safeguards when monitoring the prisoner’s level of consciousness 
 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 2742.  Justice Sotomayor’s dissent argues that Lockett and 
Wood’s executions are proof that midazolam cannot maintain 
unconsciousness.  See id. at 2790 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  She further 
noted that Wood was given 750 milligrams of midazolam but still “gasped 
and snorted for nearly two hours.”  Id. at 2791. 
 139.  Id. at 2783–84. 
 140.  Id. at 2786. 
 141.  Id.   
 142.  Id. at 2786–87. 
 143.  Id. at 2786.  Justice Breyer also noted in his dissent that “the 
Constitution insists that ‘every safeguard’ be ‘observed’ when ‘a defendant’s 
life is a stake.’”  Id. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Greg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976)). 
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to be adequate in preventing any constitutional violations, 
including a death row inmate’s awareness, via the administration 
of the second and third drugs.144 
2. Known and Available Methods of Execution 
Acknowledging the recent difficulties to obtain the drugs used 
in the Baze-approved protocol, the majority still insisted that 
petitioners must provide the Court with a known and available 
alternative to midazolam.145  Justice Sotomayor responded in her 
dissent that “Baze held no such thing.”146  She then distinguished 
the petitioner’s claim in Baze from petitioner’s claim in Glossip: 
In Baze, the very premise of the petitioners’ Eighth 
Amendment claim was that they had “identified a 
significant risk of harm [in Kentucky’s protocol] that 
[could] be eliminated by adopting alternative 
procedures.” . . .  Thus, the “grounds . . . asserted” for 
relief in Baze were that the State’s protocol was 
intolerably risky given the alternative procedures the 
State could have employed.147 
Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority contradicted Hill 
v. McDonough, where the Court held that identifying an 
“alternative, authorized method of execution” was not required 
when challenging a state’s execution protocol.148  She asserted 
 
 144.  Id. at 2742 (majority opinion).  Justice Alito wrote, “many other 
safeguards that Oklahoma has adopted mirror those that the dissent in Baze 
complained were absent from Kentucky’s protocol in that case.”  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 2738–39.  Baze held that “the Eighth Amendment requires a 
prisoner to plead and prove a known and available alternative” to a 
challenged procedure, which petitioners failed to do.  See id. at 2739.  
“Petitioners do not seriously contest this factual finding [(that sodium 
thiopental and pentobarbital are not available to Oklahoma)], and they have 
not identified any available drug or drugs that could be used in place of those 
that Oklahoma is now unable to obtain.”  Id. at 2738. 
 146.  Id. at 2793 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  “Simply stated, the ‘Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishments.’ . . .  The Court today, however, would convert this categorical 
prohibition into a conditional one.”  Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 330 (1989)).  
 147.  Id. at 2794 (alterations in original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 
35, 51 (2008)).  
 148.  Id. (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 582 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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that because the Court in Hill did not require proof of an 
alternative method as a requirement in order to bring a successful 
Eighth Amendment claim, holding otherwise would be contrary to 
the Court’s precedent.149  The dissent also found it “odd to punish 
[petitioners] for the actions of pharmaceutical companies and 
others who seek to disassociate themselves from the death 
penalty” because the result of the drug shortage is that petitioners 
were unable to source an alternative to midazolam to meet the 
Court’s requirement.150 
Furthermore, not only did Justice Sotomayor find that the 
majority opinion contradicted Hill, but she argued that it also 
relied on a holding in Baze that did not exist.151  As discussed 
previously, it was uncertain what the Baze Court held because 
Justice Thomas’ concurrence, joined by Justice Scalia, disagreed 
with the substantial risk analysis proffered in the judgment—the 
same analysis that also included the need for an alternative 
method.152  Even if a majority of the Court had agreed to that 
standard, the standard never required that every challenge 
undergo the same analysis since the challenge in Baze was 
different from the challenge in Glossip.153 
Justice Sotomayor also mentioned that this new requirement 
of an alternative method could become “an invitation to propose 
methods of execution less consistent with modern sensibilities.”154  
Specifically, the dissent discussed how reverting back to use of the 
firing squad “could be seen as a devolution to a more primitive 
era,” which she sees as a “step in the opposite direction,” and 
possibly unconstitutional under an evolving standard of 
decency.155  However, an inmate may find that “such visible yet 
 
 149.  Id. at 2794–95, 2797. 
 150.  Id. at 2796.   
 151.  Id. at 2793–94. 
 152.  Id. at 2793.  “Because the position that a plaintiff challenging a 
method of execution under the Eighth Amendment must prove the 
availability of an alternative means of execution did not ‘represent the views 
of a majority of the Court,’ it was not the holding of the Baze Court.”  Id. 
(quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987)). 
 153.  Id. at 2794.   
 154.  Id. at 2796.   
 155.  Id. at 2796–97.  Dissenting from a Ninth Circuit refusal to rehear a 
case resulting in a death sentence, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski wrote: 
The guillotine is probably [the best method] but seems inconsistent 
with our national ethos.  And the electric chair, hanging and the gas 
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relatively painless violence may be vastly preferable to an 
excruciatingly painful death hidden behind a veneer of 
medication.”156  Lastly, in response to the majority’s conclusion 
that, because execution is constitutional, there must be a 
constitutional method of execution, the dissent argued that the 
execution methods that are “‘barbarous,’ or ‘involve[] torture or a 
lingering death,’ do[] not become less so because it is the only 
method currently available to a State.”157 
D. Glossip Conclusion and Analysis 
Even if Baze did not hold that a petitioner must provide a 
known and available alternative in order to prove that a current 
method presents a substantial risk of pain, it is clear that the 
Glossip majority did.  Now, death row inmates must enter into a 
battle of persuasion with the Court—not to prove that their death 
is unconstitutional—but, rather, to prove the most effective 
method for their execution.  Setting the issues of the Court’s 
reliance on faulty precedent aside, how does this standard make 
sense in today’s society? 
It is undisputed that past execution drugs have been withheld 
by their own manufacturers solely because the companies do not 
wish to be associated with the death penalty.158  It is also 
undisputed that government-funded human experimentation is 
prohibited.159  This begs the question: What exactly is a petitioner 
 
chamber are each subject to occasional mishaps.  The firing squad 
strikes me as the most promising.  Eight or ten large-caliber rifle 
bullets fired at close range can inflict massive damage, causing 
instant death every time.  There are plenty of people employed by 
the state who can pull the trigger and have the training to aim true.   
Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014) (mem.).  Chief Judge Kozinski 
seems to suggest that the best way to ensure that a method will not cause 
cruel and unusual punishment is through certainty.  Id.  That is, a procedure 
that is successful and will not cause the inmate additional suffering.  Id. 
 156.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2797 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 157.  Id. at 2795 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981)); 
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)).   
 158.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2796.   
 159.  Information on Protection of Human Subjects in Research Funded or 
Regulated by U.S. Government, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http:// 
www.hhs.gov/1946inoculationstudy/protection.html (last visited Feb. 29, 
2016). 
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supposed to do in the face of a controversial execution protocol?  If 
he or she cannot somehow convince the manufacturers to 
distribute, or alternatively test, new drugs for their ability to 
obtain and maintain consciousness, then it is clear that the 
petitioner has no recourse in the courts as the standard is written.  
Is this really what the Glossip Court intended? 
V. OVERARCHING ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The Glossip majority did not intend to start a conversation as 
to whether the death penalty is per se unconstitutional: Justice 
Alito was clear that, “because it is settled that capital punishment 
is constitutional, ‘[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a 
[constitutional] means of carrying it out.’”160  However, both 
dissents in Glossip and a subsequent case in Connecticut proved 
that, while Justice Alito did not intend to spark the conversation, 
the dialogue has indeed begun. 
A. Justice Breyer’s Dissent in Glossip 
In his Glossip dissent, Justice Breyer questioned the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.161  He claimed that there 
are certain “constitutional defects,” such as “(1) serious 
unreliability, (2) arbitrariness in application, . . . (3) 
unconscionably long delays that undermine the death penalty’s 
penological purpose,” and finally “(4) most places within the 
United States have abandoned its use.”162 
Justice Breyer argued that excessive delays while on death 
row are cruel.163  In comparison to 1960, where the average delay 
from the sentencing to the actual execution was two years, the 
average delay for a prisoner is now approximately eighteen 
years.164  In light of this observation, the dissent argues that 
 
 160.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732–33 (majority opinion) (alterations in 
original) (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)). 
 161.  Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 162.  Id. at 2756.  Chief Judge Kozinski from the Ninth Circuit once wrote: 
“The death penalty, as we now administer it, has no deterrent value because 
it is imposed so infrequently and so freakishly.  To get executed in America 
these days you have to be not only a truly nasty person, but also very, very 
unlucky.”  Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On 
Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 25 (1995). 
 163.  Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764.   
 164.  Id.   
NOBRIGA FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  8:02 PM 
2016] THE BATTLE OF PERSUASION 397 
“unless we abandon the procedural requirements that assure 
fairness and reliability, we are forced to confront the problem of 
increasingly lengthy delays in capital cases.  Ultimately, though 
these legal causes may help to explain, they do not mitigate the 
harms caused by delay itself.”165  Furthermore, Justice Breyer 
stated that “[a] death penalty system that seeks procedural 
fairness and reliability brings with it delays that severely 
aggravate the cruelty of capital punishment and significantly 
undermine the rationale for imposing a sentence of death in the 
first place.”166  Lastly, the dissent used the decline in executions 
as evidence to support the theory that the punishment itself is 
“unusual,” as it shows consistent change among the states.167 
B. Decline in Connecticut 
On August 25, 2012, the Connecticut legislature repealed the 
death penalty prospectively.168  Exactly three years later, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Santiago, held that the 
repeal applied retroactively to those still on death row because the 
“state’s death penalty no longer comports with contemporary 
standards of decency and no longer serves any legitimate 
penological purpose.”169  The Connecticut Supreme Court 
ultimately found, like Justice Breyer in his Glossip dissent, that 
lengthy delays170 and the historical development of the death 
penalty171 among other considerations, created profound issues for 
 
 165.  Id.  Justice Breyer also argued that lengthy delays are cruel because 
confinement on death row itself is dehumanizing.  Id. at 2765. 
 166.  Id. at 2772. 
 167.  Id. at 2772–74 (noting that only seven states executed inmates in 
2014). 
 168.  An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies, Pub. Act 12-5, 2012 
Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess. 2012). 
 169.  122 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2015).  
 170.  “The man you wanted to kill was the abusive robber, high on crack, 
who pistol-whipped and shot two customers . . . in 1984.  Instead, in 1990, the 
state electrocutes a balding, religious, model prisoner in a neat blue-denim 
uniform.”  Id. at 63 (quoting Samuel R. Gross, The Romance of Revenge: 
Capital Punishment in America, 13 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 71, 82 (1993)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171.  The court found that the historical development of the death penalty 
shows that the state had only carried out only one execution in the past fifty-
five years noting that the inmate “all but forced the state to carry out his 
sentence.”  Id. at 38. 
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a modern society.172  The dissent in Santiago argued that the 
majority used an improper analysis and violated the separation of 
powers in concluding that the state’s repeal on the death penalty 
should apply retroactively; specifically, the legislature, in 
repealing the death penalty prospectively, did not intend for a 
retroactive repeal unless it had provided such.173 
CONCLUSION 
While larger questions about the constitutionality of the 
death penalty exist, this Comment contemplates only the crucial 
questions and concerns stemming from the Court’s decision in 
Glossip.  Is the Court truly requiring petitioners to choose their 
own execution methods knowing full well that effective drugs are 
no longer on the market?  Could the Court be suggesting that 
petitioners look to past methods, which could be seen as 
devolution of our society’s modern view of capital punishment?  
Or, worse, must those petitioners attempt to test a new method on 
their own to determine how much pain it could cause when 
compared to the current method? 
If so, then the Court is making it seemingly impossible for 
petitioners to challenge their death sentences on the basis of a 
substantial risk of pain.  A petitioner’s burden of persuasion is 
now practically insurmountable in light of the scarcity of several 
drugs.  Psychologically, the burden of persuasion also rises to a 
level of cruelty when one imagines the circumstances where 
petitioners are researching how a state can best kill him or her 
with the least risk of pain.  This burden—both emotional and 
legal—should not be on a petitioner.  If a state wants to sentence 
its citizens to death, the burden should fall on the state to execute 
its citizens in way that comports with society’s standard of 
decency. 
 
 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Id. at 137 (Rogers, C.J., dissenting). 
